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Cardinal voting systems: Difference between revisions
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Normalization can also more broadly refer to when a voter's rated ballot is adjusted to fit between any two scores i.e. if the highest score a voter gave anyone was a 3 out of 5, then in some situations, it is desirable to ensure that after normalization, the voter's highest score given to any candidate will still be a 3 out of 5. This can be the case when a voter does not want to use all of their voting power.
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{{Main|Arrow's impossibility theorem}}
Some activists believe that [[Arrow's impossibility theorem]] only applies to [[Ordinal Voting|ordinal voting]] and not
However, subsequent social choice theorists have expanded on Arrow's central insight, and applied his ideas more broadly. For example, the [[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]] (published in 1973) holds that any deterministic process of collective decision making with multiple options will have some level of [[strategic voting]]. As a result of this much of the work of social choice theorists is to find out what types of [[strategic voting]] a system is susceptible to and the level of susceptibility for each. For example [[Single Member system | Single Member systems]] are not susceptible to [[Free riding]].
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