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Cardinal voting systems: Difference between revisions
→Applicability of Arrow's theorem: a little more tweaking. I'm done for now...
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===Applicability of Arrow's theorem===
:''{{Main|Arrow's impossibility theorem}}''
[[Arrow's impossibility theorem]] demonstrates the impossibility of designing a set of rules for social decision making that would obey every ‘reasonable’ criterion required by society. Some activists believe that
However, subsequent social choice theorists have expanded on Arrow's central insight, and applied his ideas more broadly. For example, the [[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]] (published in 1973) holds that any deterministic process of collective decision making with multiple options will have some level of [[strategic voting]]. As a result of this much of the work of social choice theorists is to find out what types of [[strategic voting]] a system is susceptible to and the level of susceptibility for each. For example [[Single Member system | Single Member systems]] are not susceptible to [[Free riding]].
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