Condorcet//Approval: Difference between revisions
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When approval is implemented such that it isn't possible to rank some candidate X over an approved candidate Y without also approving candidate X, Condorcet//Approval and similar methods have good burial resistance. |
When approval is implemented such that it isn't possible to rank some candidate X over an approved candidate Y without also approving candidate X, Condorcet//Approval and similar methods have good burial resistance. |
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== Example == |
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<br /> |
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https://rangevoting.org/CondStratProb.html |
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Honest votes: |
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{| class="wikitable" |
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!#voters |
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!Their vote |
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|- |
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|6 |
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|A>C>B>D |
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|- |
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|2 |
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|B>C>A>D |
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|- |
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|3 |
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|B>A>C>D |
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|- |
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|2 |
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|C>D>A>B |
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|- |
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|2 |
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|C>B>A>D |
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|- |
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|5 |
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|D>C>A>B |
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|- |
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|1 |
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|D>A>C>B |
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|} |
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The Condorcet winner is C. |
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Strategic votes: |
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{| class="wikitable" |
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!#voters |
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!Their vote |
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|- |
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|6 |
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|'''A>B>D>C''' |
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|- |
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|2 |
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|B>C>A>D |
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|- |
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|3 |
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|B>A>C>D |
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|- |
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|2 |
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|C>D>A>B |
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|- |
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|2 |
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|C>B>A>D |
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|- |
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|5 |
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|D>C>A>B |
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|- |
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|1 |
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|D>A>C>B |
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|} |
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The A-top voters' strategy would make A win in most Condorcet methods, but supposing every voter sets their approval threshold between C and A, C still wins in both Condorcet//Approval and Smith//Approval. |
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In this sense, Condorcet-cardinal hybrids can use cardinal information to allow voters to focus on the pairwise matchups most important to them, which are usually the ones between the frontrunners. |
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===Explicit/Implicit Approval=== |
===Explicit/Implicit Approval=== |
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