Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions

The Condorcet[[Bipartisan set]] (a subset of the winner/[[Smith set]]) is athe common [[equilibrium]] point inof manymost voting methods. This is because a majority/plurality of voters have no incentive to deviate towards another candidate. The Condorcet criterion can thus be considered a type of [[Declared strategy voting|automatic strategy]], which reduces the need for [[compromising]] strategy by electing candidates who could have won with majority-strength compromising.

B is the CW. If voters approve everyone they ranked before the "|", then B is approved by all voters, and wins. If any of the three groups of voters here raises their approval threshold (only approves their 1st choice), then another group has an incentive to maintain their approval threshold where it is i.e. if C-top voters stop approving B, then the 69 voters who prefer B>C have an incentive to move their approval thresholds between B and C to ensure B is approved by a majority and C is not. Note that this requires both accurate polling and coordinated [[Strategic voting|strategic voting]].