Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
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* Less [[precinct-summable]] than some other voting methods (because it requires [[pairwise counting]])
* Possibly less [[Strategic voting|strategically resistant]] (voters may [[Burying|bury]] with frequency); this is because the Condorcet criterion implies failure of [[later-no-help]].
** The Condorcet criterion also implies failure of [[later-no-harm]],<ref name="Woodall-Monotonicity">
**Non-Condorcet methods (usually referring to [[Score voting]]) may be more [[Smith-efficient]] than actual Condorcet methods due to <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rangevoting.org/CondStratProb.html|title=RangeVoting.org - How Condorcet voting can fail to elect Condorcet Winner|website=rangevoting.org|access-date=2020-05-14}}</ref>.
***[Rebuttal] [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]] are less susceptible to this issue than other Condorcet methods; in the example provided, strategic voters could place their [[approval threshold]] in such a way as to elect the CW.
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