Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions

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Handle possible ambiguity wrt majority criterion (or majority criterion being too lax).
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m (Handle possible ambiguity wrt majority criterion (or majority criterion being too lax).)
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A method passes the M-seat Condorcet criterion if its M-seat election outcome always contains such a ''b'' when he exists, and passes the multi-winner Condorcet criterion if it passes the M-seat Condorcet criterion for all M.
 
When M=1, and the generalizationmethod reduceselects tothe candidate with the ordinarymost Condorcetfirst criterionpreferences aswhen longthere asare only two candidates, the methodgeneralization passesreduces to the majorityordinary Condorcet criterion.
 
Note that Bloc Ranked Pairs and Bloc Score voting (if scored methods are considered) would pass this criterion, though they are not proportional, and the latter is not a Condorcet method in the single-winner case. So it may make more sense to consider Schulze's criterion as one of several that a multi-winner method ought to pass to be considered a Condorcet multi-winner or Condorcet PR method, rather than the definitive one.
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