Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions

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Make more clear that DH3 failure is not inherent to Condorcet compliance
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** [Rebuttal] This can be addressed to a large extent by using a simple implementation of the [[rated pairwise preference ballot]].
* It implies failure of the [[Favorite Betrayal|Favorite Betrayal criterion]] (possibly leading to [[two-party domination]])
* May lead to [[DH3]] failures (frequently elects the worst candidate due to strategic voting) unless the method is constructed to avoid this (e.g. [[Benham's method]]).
 
It has been argued that [[Condorcet methods]] may elect the CW less often than other voting methods, generally [[rated method]]<nowiki/>s.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rangevoting.org/CondStratProb.html|title=RangeVoting.org - How Condorcet voting can fail to elect Condorcet Winner|website=rangevoting.org|access-date=2020-05-05}}</ref> [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]] generally avoid this issue.
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