Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
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== Criticism ==
The Condorcet criterion
=== Operational concerns ===
* Less [[precinct-summable]] than some other voting methods (because it requires [[pairwise counting]]).▼
* Harder to understand than other voting methods due to pairwise logic.
=== Susceptibility to strategy ===
** The Condorcet criterion's implication of [[later-no-harm]] failure may also incentivize [[bullet voting]].
▲* Less [[precinct-summable]] than some other voting methods (because it requires [[pairwise counting]])
▲** The Condorcet criterion also implies failure of [[later-no-harm]],<ref name="Woodall-Monotonicity">{{cite journal| title = Monotonicity and single-seat election rules| last = Woodall| first = Douglas R.| journal = Voting matters| volume = 6| pages = 9–14| year = 1996|url=http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE6/P4.HTM}}</ref> which may incentivize [[bullet voting]]
**Non-Condorcet methods (usually referring to [[Score voting]]) may be more [[Smith-efficient]] than actual Condorcet methods due to <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://rangevoting.org/CondStratProb.html|title=RangeVoting.org - How Condorcet voting can fail to elect Condorcet Winner|website=rangevoting.org|access-date=2020-05-14}}</ref>. ▼
***[Rebuttal] [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods]] are less susceptible to this issue than other Condorcet methods; in the example provided, strategic voters could place their [[approval threshold]] in such a way as to elect the CW. ▼
* It implies failure of the [[Favorite Betrayal|Favorite Betrayal criterion]] (possibly leading to [[two-party domination]])
* May lead to [[DH3]] failures (frequently elects the worst candidate due to strategic voting) unless the method is constructed to avoid this (e.g. [[Benham's method]]).
=== Quality of winners ===
* The weak centrist argument: Condorcet methods don't take [[strength of preference]] information into account, and thus can't distinguish between a strong consensus candidate and a bland centrist who is inoffensive enough to be everybody's second choice.
** ''Rebuttal'': Ranked ballots can't tell the two scenarios apart, so a ranked method that doesn't elect a weak centrist [[center squeeze|won't elect a strong centrist either]]. Electing a strong centrist may be worth the chance of electing a weak centrist. The problem can also be addressed by using a [[rated pairwise preference ballot]].
* The Condorcet criterion's preference for consensus winners may lead centrists to win so often that they become near-monopolists, if the political contest takes place on a line (like a left-right spectrum).
** ''Rebuttal'': The problem vanishes with multidimensional politics, and thus Condorcet methods reward candidates who break politics out of its one-dimensional mold.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-August/010574.html|title=[EM] Condorcet 2 - The Sequel ( the same people say the same things)|website=Election-methods mailing list archives|date=2003-08-07|last=Small|first=Alex}}</ref>
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