Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
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* The weak centrist argument: Condorcet methods don't take [[strength of preference]] information into account, and thus can't distinguish between a strong consensus candidate and a bland centrist who is inoffensive enough to be everybody's second choice.
** ''Rebuttal'': Ranked ballots can't tell the two scenarios apart, so a ranked method that doesn't elect a weak centrist [[center squeeze|won't elect a strong centrist either]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-November/074157.html|title=Sports and "The Condorcet Mindset"|website=Election-methods mailing list archives|date=2002-11-17|last=Small|first=Alex}}</ref> Electing a strong centrist may be worth the
* The Condorcet criterion's preference for consensus winners may lead centrists to win so often that they become near-monopolists, if the political contest takes place on a line (like a left-right spectrum).
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