Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
m
Fixed typo
(FIxed compromise candidate HTML mess, and added the picture that was linked so it's now inline. Rewrote some parts to emphasize the link between CW and compromise strategy.) |
m (Fixed typo) |
||
Line 63:
[[File:Left,_Center,_Right.png]]
Supposing this is the voter distribution, with three candidates '''L'''eft, '''C'''enter, and '''R'''ight, with voters concentrated in each area of the distribution as given, with the yellow voters preferring Left, the green preferring Center, and the blue preferring Right. Then the Condorcet winner is Center, because a majority - the Center voters plus the Left voters - prefers Center to Right, and another majority
[[Instant-runoff voting]], which does not pass the Condorcet criterion, fails to detect Center's support and thus Center is eliminated early. However, if the majority preferring Center to the IRV winner knew this in advance, they could have used [[compromising]] strategy to force Center to be elected anyway. See below.
| |||