Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions

Removed the symmetrical ICT stuff as it doesn't actually pass the FBC.
(Improved references by filling in more information.)
(Removed the symmetrical ICT stuff as it doesn't actually pass the FBC.)
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===Alternative definitions===
The [[tied at the top]] rule redefines the Condorcet beat relation so that methods using it can pass Condorcet whenever there are no equal-rank, and in addition passes the [[favorite betrayal criterion]]. Doing so in effect trades some Condorcet winner compliance for FBC compliance.
'''Alternative definition of "beat" that is claimed to be more consistent with the preferences, intent and wishes of equal-top-ranking voters:'''
 
(Argument supporting that claim can be found at the [[Symmetrical ICT]] article.)
 
{{definition|1=
 
(X>Y) means the number of ballots voting X over Y.
 
(Y>X) means the number of ballots voting Y over X.
 
(X=Y)T means the number of ballots voting X and Y at top
 
(a ballot votes a candidate at top if it doesn't vote anyone over him/her)
 
X beats Y iff (X>Y) > (Y>X) + (X=Y)T
 
}}
 
With this alternative definition of "beat", [[FBC]] and the Condorcet Criterion are compatible.
 
It has been recently argued that the definition of the verb "beat" should be regarded as external to the Condorcet Criterion...and that "beat should be defined in a way that interprets equal-top ranking consistent with the actual preferences, intent and wishes of the equal-top-ranking voters. When such a definition of "beat" is used in the Condorcet Criterion definition, then the Condorcet Criterion is compatible with [[FBC]], and there are Condorcet methods that pass [[FBC]]. Discussion and arguments on that matter can be found at the [[Symmetrical ICT]] article.
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
 
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