Condorcet winner criterion: Difference between revisions
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===Equilibrium point for various voting methods===
The
An example for [[Approval voting]]:
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31: C>B|>A
B is the CW. If voters approve everyone they ranked before the "|", then B is approved by all voters, and wins. If any of the three groups of voters here raises their approval threshold (only approves their 1st choice), then another group has an incentive to maintain their approval threshold where it is i.e. if C-top voters stop approving B, then the 69 voters who prefer B>C have an incentive to move their approval thresholds between B and C to ensure B is approved by a majority and C is not. Note that this requires both accurate polling and coordinated [[Strategic voting|strategic voting]].
===Non-complying methods===
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