Consistency criterion: Difference between revisions

Fixed erroneous claim
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A [[voting system]] is '''consistent''' if, when the electorate is divided arbitrarily into two parts and separate elections in each part result in the same alternative being selected, an election of the entire electorate also selects that alternative. If a voting system is not consistent then it may be manipulated through the establishment of strategically configured election districts.
 
A [[Scale invariance|scale invariant]] preferential voting method is consistent iff its [[win region|win regions]] are convex.
 
==Complying methods==
 
A strict [[preferential voting]] method is "consistent if and only if it is a scoring function", i.e. a [[weighted positional method]] or a combination of these where each voter is assigned one of a number of weighted positional methods.<ref name="Young 1975 pp. 824–838">{{cite journal | last=Young | first=H. P. | title=Social Choice Scoring Functions | journal=SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics | publisher=Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) | volume=28 | issue=4 | year=1975 | issn=0036-1399 | doi=10.1137/0128067 | pages=824–838 |url=http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall11/papers/Young75.pdf}}</ref>, i.e. aEvery [[weighted positional methodsymmetry|symmetric]] orconsistent amethod combinationis ofthus these where one or morea weighted positional methods are used in sequence to break the ties of another. If the preferential voting method admits weak preference orders (rankings with equal-rank or truncation), it must reduce to a scoring function when no voters make use of equal-rank or truncation.
 
If the preferential voting method admits weak preference orders (rankings with equal-rank or truncation), it must reduce to a scoring function when no voters make use of equal-rank or truncation.
<!-- It would be nice to find a reference that handles weak preference orderings, but I haven't been able to find one. -->
 
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In addition, [[Approval voting]] and [[Score voting]] are consistent. If X is the winner in the first district, then that means that X's score is greater than or equal to any other Y, and the same for the second district. Then summing the districts' scores can not make any Y's sum exceed X's sum.
 
== Notes ==
It has been argued that failure of the consistency criterion can make a voting method more susceptible to gerrymandering, since gerrymandering is essentially about splitting voters into different groups in order to get a certain more-preferred set of election outcomes from each group. See https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/fhkksz/what_do_you_all_think_about_the_participation/fkbwvz5/.
 
==References==
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