Cumulative voting: Difference between revisions

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Fix typo and add zero-info strategy for quadratic voting.
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m (Fix typo and add zero-info strategy for quadratic voting.)
 
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A variant of cumulative voting which gained popularity in 2018 is "[[quadratic voting]]". Quadratic voting was conducted in an experiment by the Democratic caucus of the Colorado House of Representatives in April 2019. It differs from cumulative voting by altering "the cost" and "the vote" relation from linear to quadratic.
 
Quadratic voting is characterized by the optimal zero-information strategic vote (using Myerson-Weber strategy) being to vote honestly -- that is, to vote according to any affine scaling of one's honest utilities.
 
=== Criticism ===
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for some <math>\epsilon</math> where <math>x > \epsilon > 0</math>. A wins by majority rule no matter the value of p.
 
Clone A into A1 and A2 so that everybody rates the two clones equal. The <math>\ell_p</math> normalization then leads to the first faction giving each A candidate <math>y = \frac{1}{\sqrt[p]{2}}</math> points each. As a result, thethere's twoa A candidatesthree-way tie ifwhen <math>\epsilon=0</math>, and B wins for any <math>\epsilon > 0</math>, which demonstrates the clone failure.
 
==== Example ====
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