D'Hondt method: Difference between revisions

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Change D'Hondt to d'Hondt per the Oxford Reference: https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095715357. Do some more cleanup and add Phragmén's method.
m (Change D'Hondt to d'Hondt per the Oxford Reference: https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095715357. Do some more cleanup and add Phragmén's method.)
 
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{{Wikipedia}}
 
The '''d'Hondt method''' or the Jefferson method (both are equivalent, but described differently) is a highest averages method for allocating seats. This system favors large parties slightly more than the other popular [[divisor method]], [[Sainte-Laguë method|Sainte-Laguë]], does. The method described is named in the United States after Thomas Jefferson, who introduced the method for proportional allocation of seats in the United States House of Representatives in 1792, and in Europe after Belgian mathematician Victor Dd'Hondt, who described the methodology in 1878.
 
It is used in: Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark (for local elections), Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, as well as elections to the European Parliament in some countries. The method is named after Belgian mathematician [[Victor d'Hondt]]. Jefferson's method is named after Thomas Jefferson, and was used to apportion the U.S. House of Representatives between 1792 and 1840.
The '''d'Hondt method''' or the Jefferson method (both are equivalent, but described differently) is a highest averages method for allocating seats. This system favors large parties slightly more than the other popular [[divisor method]], [[Sainte-Laguë method|Sainte-Laguë]], does. The method described is named in the United States after Thomas Jefferson, who introduced the method for proportional allocation of seats in the United States House of Representatives in 1792, and in Europe after Belgian mathematician Victor D'Hondt, who described the methodology in 1878.
 
It is used in: Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark (for local elections), Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, as well as elections to the European Parliament in some countries. The method is named after Belgian mathematician [[Victor d'Hondt]]. Jefferson's method is named after Thomas Jefferson, and was used to apportion the U.S. House of Representatives between 1792 and 1840.
 
==Allocation==
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The rationale behind this procedure (and the Sainte-Laguë procedure) is to allocate seats in proportion to the number of votes a list received, by maintaining the ratio of votes received to seats allocated as close as possible. This makes it possible for parties having relatively few votes to be represented.
 
One way to think of the formula is that it first shows who can win the most votes for the first seat, and then if the party that won the first seat can plug more votes per seat for two seats than any other party can for even one seat, it gives that same party two seats; otherwise it gives another party one seat. This logic repeats until all seats have been allocated.
 
==Example==
As a simple example, if there are 2 seats to be filled, with Party A having 300 votes and Party B having 290 votes, then Party A wins the first seat, with their new vote total becoming 150 votes (calculated as 300/((1)+1) = 300/2). This means Party A now has 150 votes and Party B has 290 votes, so Party B wins the second seat, and the procedure is over.
 
A larger example (<font color="#FF0000">red</font> indicates that party won a seat in that round because it had the most votes of any party in that round; this table can be thought of as going in "rounds", with the first round showing how many votes each party had, and each successive round showing how many votes each party had after applying the Dd'Hondt procedure):<table width="100%" border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
<tr>
<td><div align="right"></div></td>
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==Variations==
 
The Hagenbach-Bischoff system is equivalent to, and is a faster way of doing Dd'Hondt: It works by first assigning each party as many seats as they have [[Hagenbach-Bischoff quota|Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas]], and then running Dd'Hondt with the recognition of the seats already won by each party.
 
In some cases, a [[election threshold|threshold]] or ''barrage'' is set, and any list which does not receive that threshold will not have any seats allocated to it, even if it received enough votes to otherwise have been rewarded with a seat. Examples of countries using this threshold are Israel (1.5%) and Belgium (5%, on regional basis).
 
Some systems allow parties to associate their lists together into a single ''cartel'' in order to overcome the threshold, while some systems set a separate threshold for cartels. Smaller parties often form pre-election [[coalition]]scoalitions to make sure they get past the election threshold.
 
== Jefferson's method ==
Jefferson's method is equivalent to Dd'Hondt, but is described differently: <blockquote>Choose a divisor D. A state with population N (or a political party with N seats) is entitled to floor(N/D) seats. If the number of seats allocated equals the size of the legislative body, then use the apportionment just calculated. Otherwise, choose a new value for D and try again.</blockquote>Example: In 1790, the U.S. had 15 states. For the purpose of allocating seats in the House of Representatives, the state populations were as follows:
{| class="wikitable"
!State
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!60
|}
 
== Computational complexity ==
Let <math>s</math> be the number of seats and <math>r</math> be the number of parties. The standard sequential allocation procedure determines the outcome in <math>O(s \log r)</math> time. More sophisticated algorithms can determine the outcome in <math>O(r \log r)</math> time.<ref name="Gall 2003 pp. 325–333">{{cite journal | last=Gall | first=Françoise Le | title=Determination of the modes of a Multinomial distribution | journal=Statistics & Probability Letters | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=62 | issue=4 | year=2003 | issn=0167-7152 | doi=10.1016/s0167-7152(02)00430-3 | pages=332-333}}</ref><ref name="White Hendy 2010 pp. 63–68">{{cite journal | last=White | first=W.T.J. | last2=Hendy | first2=M.D. | title=A fast and simple algorithm for finding the modes of a multinomial distribution | journal=Statistics & Probability Letters | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=80 | issue=1 | year=2010 | issn=0167-7152 | doi=10.1016/j.spl.2009.09.013 | pages=63–68}}</ref>
 
== Extensions of theory ==
 
One of the only ranked PR methods that reduces to d'Hondt in its [[party list case]] is [[Schulze STV]]. Several [[cardinal PR]] methods reduce to d'Hondt if certain divisors are used. Some of these are:
 
* [[Phragmen's voting rules|Phragmén's method]]
* [[Reweighted Range Voting|Reweighted Range voting]]
* [[Sequential proportional approval voting]]
* [[Single distributed vote]]
 
== Notes ==
Parties can generally guarantee themselves at least as many seats as they would get in Dd'Hondt in any PR method by doing [[Vote management|vote management]]. In fact, an alternative way to visualize d'Hondt is to see how many seats each party could guaranteeably win if doing vote management. One thing that can help in this visualization is that all [[Highest averages method|Highest averages methods]] pass [[House monotonicity criterion|House monotonicity]], therefore they can all be visualized as simply filling one seat at a time with no change to the result. Example:
 
A 10 B 7 C 4 D 3
 
A gets the first seat. Now, we can see the vote totals as:
 
'''A 5 A 5''' B 7 C 4 D 3
 
In other words, now that A got the first seat, they are "looking to play" for two seats; they are seeing if they can secure two seats no matter what the other parties do with their votes. Notice that the idea of the division is that if the other parties try to take the one seat that A has, then A can re-fuse its votes to ensure they have more votes than the other parties. B gets the second seat and the votes become:
 
A 5 A 5 '''B 3.5 B 3.5''' C 4 D 3
 
So here it is seen that A gets the third seat. This is because by splitting their votes evenly between two seats, they can put more votes per seat than any of the other parties can put for two or even one seat (i.e. Party C and Party D can't even put 5 votes in for one seat). The votes would then become
 
'''A 3.333 A 3.333 A 3.333''' B 3.5 B 3.5 C 4 D 3
 
etc.
 
The reason d'Hondt guarantees every party at least as many seats as they have more voters than that number of HB quotas, thus satisfying the [[Droop proportionality criterion]], is because there is always 1 HB quota more than the number of seats, so when a party has more voters than k HB quotas, it can divide its votes to do more than a quota per seat for k seats, whereas all other parties combined can at most do just under (((total number of seats + 1)-k)/(number of seats - (k - 1))) i.e. the most votes the other parties can have divided by the number of seats they're trying to take. For example, if there are 10 seats to be filled, and one party has over 3 HB quotas, then they can take at least 3 seats because they can do over 1 quota per seat for 3,and for all other parties to take at least (10-(3-1))=8 seats (the minimum required for them to deny the other party 3 seats, since you can't get 3 seats if 8 out of 10 seats are already allotted), the other parties can do at most just under ((10+1)-3)/8)=1 quota per seat for 8 seats.
 
The divisor in d'Hondt will always be equal to or smaller than a [[Hare quota]], because that is the largest divisor possible such that there are only as many winners as seats to be filled.
 
TheOne reasoneasy Dway to do d'Hondt guaranteesin everycertain partysimple atexamples leastis asto manycompare seatsall asparties theyexcept havethe moreparty voterswith thanthe thatfewest numbervotes of(the HBlast-place quotasparty) iswith becausethe therelast-place isparty; alwaysif 1all HBother quotaparties can split more votes per seat than the numberlast-place ofparty seats,has sofor wheneven aone partyseat hassuch morethat votersall thanother kparties HBwould quotas,be itable canto dividewin itsa votescombined number of seats equal to door moregreater than athe quotanumber perof seatseats forto kbe seatsfilled, whereasthen allthe otherlast-place parties combinedparty can atbe mosteliminated, doand justthis underprocedure repeated, (((totalto numberfind ofa seatsminimum + 1)-k)/(number of seats -each (kparty -must 1)))win i.ein d'Hondt. theExample: mostSuppose votesthere theare other8 partiesseats canto havebe dividedfilled, byand the4 numberparties, ofA seatsthrough they'reD, tryingwith tothe take.votes Forbeing example,(in ifdescending thereorder) areA: 10, seatsB: to8, beC: filled3, and oneD: 2. Start by dividing every party's hasvotes overby 3just HBover quotas,the thenlast-place theyparty's can(D's) takevote attotal least(just 3over seats2). becauseEach theyparty can doput overmore 1than quota2 votes per seat for 3,andthis fornumber allof other parties to takeseats: atA: least4 (10-(3-1))/2 =8 seats5, (thewhich minimummoved requireddown forto themthe tonext-closest denyinteger theis other4), partyB: 3 seats,(8/2 since= you4, can'tshifted getdown = 3), seatsand ifC: 81 out(3/2 of= 101.5 seatsshifted aredown already= allotted1),. theIn othertotal, these parties canhave do4 at+ most just3 under ((10+1)-3)/8)= 1 quotaseats; perthis seatis forthe 8number of seats. desired, therefore, this is the final result.
 
== References ==
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<references />
 
[[Category:Party list theory]]
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