Defeat strength: Difference between revisions
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** Example method: Tideman originally defined [[Ranked Pairs]] as a margins method.<ref name="Tideman2">{{Cite journal |last=Tideman |first=T. N. |date=1987-09-01 |title=Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433944 |journal=Social Choice and Welfare |language=en |volume=4 |issue=3 |pages=185–206 |doi=10.1007/BF00433944 |issn=1432-217X}}</ref> |
** Example method: Tideman originally defined [[Ranked Pairs]] as a margins method.<ref name="Tideman2">{{Cite journal |last=Tideman |first=T. N. |date=1987-09-01 |title=Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00433944 |journal=Social Choice and Welfare |language=en |volume=4 |issue=3 |pages=185–206 |doi=10.1007/BF00433944 |issn=1432-217X}}</ref> |
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* '''pairwise (non)opposition''': number of votes for W≥L, or equivalently 1 - votes for L > W |
* '''pairwise (non)opposition''': number of votes for W≥L, or equivalently 1 - votes for L > W |
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** Gives even less strategic incentive than wv |
** Gives even less strategic incentive than wv (satisfies later-no-help and favorite betrayal) |
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** Strong intuitive appeal (pick the candidate opposed by the least voters) |
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** Violates [[plurality criterion]]. |
** Violates [[plurality criterion]]. |
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*** A complete unknown can win with no real support, just because everyone forgot to rank them on their ballot. |
*** A complete unknown can win with no real support, just because everyone forgot to rank them on their ballot. |
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** Very little strategic incentive |
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** Example method: [[MMPO]]. |
** Example method: [[MMPO]]. |
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* '''Relative margins''': Defeat strength = margin ÷ (votes for W≠L) |
* '''Relative margins''': Defeat strength = margin ÷ (votes for W≠L) |