Descending Acquiescing Coalitions: Difference between revisions
Added EM example of DAC being less first preference-focused than DSC.
imported>Kevin Lamoreau (largely redid this page to model it after the page for Descending Solid Coalitions) |
(Added EM example of DAC being less first preference-focused than DSC.) |
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'''Descending Acquiescing Coalitions''' (or '''
== Procedure ==
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== Properties ==
DAC satisfies the [[Plurality criterion]], the [[Mutual majority criterion|Majority criterion]], [[Monotonicity criterion|Mono-raise]], [[Mono-add-top criterion|Mono-add-top]], the [[Participation criterion]], the [[Later-no-help criterion]] and [[Independence of clone alternatives|Clone Independence]].
DAC fails the [[Condorcet criterion]], the [[Smith set|Smith criterion]] and the [[Later-no-harm criterion]]. It is (along with [[Descending Solid Coalitions|DSC]]) the most complicated method satisfying the [[Participation criterion]].
Like [[Descending Solid Coalitions]], DAC can be considered a [[Plurality voting|First-Preference Plurality]] variant that satisfies [[Independence of clone alternatives|Clone Independence]].
{{ballots|46: A
44: B>C
10: C}}
DAC elects C, while Plurality and DSC elect A.
===Example===
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No matter in which order we consider the sets with 42% of the voters solidly committed to them, we will arrive at the same result, which is that Nashville will be the only candidate remaining. So Nashville is the winner.
Since DAC fails the [[Later-no-harm criterion]], a voter can hurt the chances of a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate, and can thus get a better result in some cases by witholding lower preferences.
[[Category:Single-winner voting
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:Clone-independent electoral systems]]
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