Descending Acquiescing Coalitions: Difference between revisions
Added EM example of DAC being less first preference-focused than DSC.
(Changed abbreviation of "Descending Acquiescing Coalitions" from DSC to DAC) |
(Added EM example of DAC being less first preference-focused than DSC.) |
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== Properties ==
DAC satisfies the [[Plurality criterion]], the [[Mutual majority criterion|Majority criterion]], [[Monotonicity criterion|Mono-raise]], [[Mono-add-top criterion|Mono-add-top]], the [[Participation criterion]], the [[Later-no-help criterion]] and [[Independence of clone alternatives|Clone Independence]].
DAC fails the [[Condorcet criterion]], the [[Smith set|Smith criterion]] and the [[Later-no-harm criterion]]. It is (along with [[Descending Solid Coalitions|DSC]]) the most complicated method satisfying the [[Participation criterion]].
Like [[Descending Solid Coalitions]], DAC can be considered a [[Plurality voting|First-Preference Plurality]] variant that satisfies [[Independence of clone alternatives|Clone Independence]].
{{ballots|46: A
44: B>C
10: C}}
DAC elects C, while Plurality and DSC elect A.
===Example===
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Since DAC fails the [[Later-no-harm criterion]], a voter can hurt the chances of a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate, and can thus get a better result in some cases by witholding lower preferences. Since DAC satisfies the [[Later-no-help criterion]], however, a voter cannot increase the probability of election of a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate, and cannot hurt the chances of a candidate already ranked by withholding or equalizing lower preferences.
[[Category:Single-winner voting
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:Clone-independent electoral systems]]
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