Descending Acquiescing Coalitions: Difference between revisions
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imported>Kevin Lamoreau (largely redid this page to model it after the page for Descending Solid Coalitions) |
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No matter in which order we consider the sets with 42% of the voters solidly committed to them, we will arrive at the same result, which is that Nashville will be the only candidate remaining. So Nashville is the winner. |
No matter in which order we consider the sets with 42% of the voters solidly committed to them, we will arrive at the same result, which is that Nashville will be the only candidate remaining. So Nashville is the winner. |
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Since DAC fails the [[Later-no-harm criterion]], a voter can hurt the chances of a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate, and can thus get a better result in some cases by witholding lower preferences. |
Since DAC fails the [[Later-no-harm criterion]], a voter can hurt the chances of a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate, and can thus get a better result in some cases by witholding lower preferences. Since DAC satisfies the [[Later-no-help criterion]], however, a voter cannot increase the probability of election of a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate, and cannot hurt the chances of a candidate already ranked by withholding or equalizing lower preferences. |
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[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]] |
[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]] |