Descending Solid Coalitions: Difference between revisions
m
Added clone independent category
imported>Kevin Lamoreau m (→Procedure) |
m (Added clone independent category) |
||
(4 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown) | |||
Line 24:
The sets have the following strengths:
* 100 {M,N,C,K}
* 58 {N,C,K}
* 42 {M,N,C}
* 42 {M,N}
* 42 {M}
* 32 {C,K}
* 26 {N,C}
* 26 {N}
* 17 {K}
* 15 {C}
{N,C,K} is the strongest set that excludes a candidate. Memphis becomes ineligible.
Line 41:
Notice that more than half of the votes held Memphis to be the worst alternative, yet the Memphis supporters' votes were still useful in securing their second choice, Nashville. If the Memphis voters had not listed any preferences after Memphis, the winner would have been Chattanooga.
Since DSC satisfies [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]], it's not possible for a voter to get a better result by withholding lower preferences, or to hurt the chances of a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate. Since DSC fails the [[Later-no-help criterion]], however, it is possible in some cases for a voter to get a better result for a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate, or by changing the ranking of candidates ranked below that candidate such that at least one candidate is ranked above another candidate instead of being ranked the same as or below that candidate. The
[[Category:Single-winner voting
[[Category:Ranked voting methods]]
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:Clone-independent electoral systems]]
|