Descending Solid Coalitions: Difference between revisions

* 100 {M,N,C,K}<br>

* 58 {N,C,K}<br>

* 42 {M,N,C}<br>

* 42 {M,N}<br>

* 42 {M}<br>

* 32 {C,K}<br>

* 26 {N,C}<br>

* 26 {N}<br>

* 17 {K}<br>

* 15 {C}<br>

Since DSC satisfies [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]], it's not possible for a voter to get a better result by withholding lower preferences, or to hurt the chances of a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate. Since DSC fails the [[Later-no-help criterion]], however, it is possible in some cases for a voter to get a better result for a candidate already ranked by ranking additional candidates below that candidate, or by changing the ranking of candidates ranked below that candidate such that at least one candidate is ranked above another candidate instead of being ranked the same as or below that candidate. The corrolarycorollary to this statement is that it is possible in some cases for a voter to get a worse result for a candidate by withholding preferences for candidates ranked below that candidate, or by changing the ranking of candidates ranked below that candidate such that at least one candidate is ranked the same as or below another candidate instead of being ranked above that candidate. If the Nashville voters had not listed any preferences after either Nashville or Chattanooga, or had ranked Memphis the same as or above either Knoxville or Chattanooga or both, the winner would have been Memphis, as the number of candidates strictly committed to the set {N,C,K} would have been only 32, which is less than the number of candidates strictly committed to at least the sets {M} and {M,N}. Regardless of the order in which those two sets (along with the set {M,N,C} if Nashville's voters had still all ranked Chattanooga ahead of Knoxville) were considered, Memphis would have been the only candidate remaining after those two or three sets were considered and so would have been the winner.