Equilibrium: Difference between revisions

Equilibrium (view source)

Revision as of 10:52, 18 March 2020

92 bytes added , 4 years ago

Fix "strong Nash equilibrium" boldface. (There seems to be a bug.) Also rephrase the not-always-equilibrium note.

VisualWikitext

Kristomun

1,204

edits

Revision as of 23:45, 17 March 2020 (view source) BetterVotingAdvocacy (talk \| contribs) No edit summary Tag: Visual edit ← Older edit		Revision as of 10:52, 18 March 2020 (view source) Kristomun (talk \| contribs) (Fix "strong Nash equilibrium" boldface. (There seems to be a bug.) Also rephrase the not-always-equilibrium note.) Newer edit →
Line 25: ==Strong Nash equilibrium== AApplied to voting theory, a ~~<nowiki>~~'''~~Strong~~strong Nash equilibrium'''~~</nowiki> is a concept from game theory. Applied to voting theory, it~~ means a set of votes, where no coalition of voters can change their votes to get a result they all prefer. This is one of the strongest, most elusive kinds of equilibria in voting theory. The only ways to make it stronger are if it is known (through some reliable aspect of the system, not just through polling) and/or unique. It has also been called a "Coalition Proof Social Equilibrium" or CPSE. This is one of the strongest, most elusive kinds of equilibria in voting theory. The only ways to make it stronger are if it is known (through some reliable aspect of the system, not just through polling) and/or unique. It has also been called a '''coalition-proof social equilibrium''' or '''CPSE'''. ==Notes== Note that just because a voting method can have an equilibrium on a particular candidate, doesn't mean it will always. For example, consider [[Approval voting]] having an equilibrium on the [[Condorcet winner]]:<blockquote>Here's my reasoning: consider a standard chicken dilemma: Although a particular type of candidate may be elected in equilibrium for a particular election method and election, that does not necessarily imply that this candidate type is in equilibrium for every election for that method. For example, [[Approval voting]] may elect the [[Condorcet winner]] in equilibrium in some elections, but not all: <blockquote>Here's my reasoning: consider a standard chicken dilemma: {\| class="wikitable" !Number