Favorite betrayal criterion: Difference between revisions
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{{wikipedia|Draft:Favorite betrayal criterion}}
The '''favorite betrayal criterion'''
It is passed by [[Approval voting]], [[Range voting]], and [[Majority Judgment]]. All these are examples of [[cardinal voting systems]], though some voters may be reluctant to have a compromise candidate tied with their favorite candidate on their respective ballots.
On the other hand, most [[Ranked voting systems|ordinal voting systems]] do not pass this criterion. For instance, [[Borda Count]], [[Copeland's method]], [[Instant runoff voting]] (IRV, known in the UK as the Alternative Vote), [[Kemeny-Young method|Kemeny-Young]], [[Minimax Condorcet]], [[Ranked Pairs]], and [[Schulze method|Schulze]] all fail this criterion. A few ordinal methods, like [[weighted positional method|Antiplurality]], pass it. Some [[Condorcet methods]] pass it when combined with the [[tied at the top]] rule, though this means they may not be Condorcet-efficient when some voters equally rank multiple candidates.
It is also failed by [[
== Definition ==
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==Complying methods==
[[Approval voting]], [[range voting]], [[Majority Judgment]], [[MMPO|MinMax(pairwise opposition)]], [[MCA]] (except MCA-A and some versions of MCA-R), [[MAMPO]], [[Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval]], and [[Improved Condorcet Approval]] comply with the favorite betrayal criterion, as
[[Borda count]], [[plurality voting]], [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet methods]] (except for Improved Condorcet methods, such as Kevin Venzke's [[ICA]], and Chris Benham's ICT
== Examples ==
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