Improved Condorcet Approval: Difference between revisions
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'''ICA''' satisfies the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion|favorite betrayal criterion]] by treating voters ranking ''x'' and ''y'' equally at the top as attempting to create a pairwise tie between the two candidates. Then instead of looking first for a candidate with only pairwise wins (the [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet winner]]), ICA selects as finalists every candidate with no pairwise losses. |
'''ICA''' satisfies the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion|favorite betrayal criterion]] by treating voters ranking ''x'' and ''y'' equally at the top as attempting to create a pairwise tie between the two candidates. Then instead of looking first for a candidate with only pairwise wins (the [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet winner]]), ICA selects as finalists every candidate with no pairwise losses. |
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Satisfying this criterion is desirable because it means that, unlike in ordinary [[Condorcet//Approval]], voters in an ICA election can always vote ''at least'' as sincerely as under [[Approval voting]], without |
Satisfying this criterion is desirable because it means that, unlike in ordinary [[Condorcet//Approval]], voters in an ICA election can always vote ''at least'' as sincerely as under [[Approval voting]] (by ranking some candidates equally at the top, and the other candidates not at all), without forfeiting a preferable outcome that might be obtained by voting less sincerely than this. |
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As a result of this tweaking, ICA does not strictly satisfy the [[Condorcet criterion]]. It is possible that the voted Condorcet winner could lose to another candidate, due to voters tying both candidates at the top, and the Condorcet winner having lower approval. |
As a result of this tweaking, ICA does not strictly satisfy the [[Condorcet criterion]]. It is possible that the voted Condorcet winner could lose to another candidate, due to voters tying both candidates at the top, and the Condorcet winner having lower approval. |
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