Independence of irrelevant alternatives: Difference between revisions

Independence of irrelevant alternatives (view source)

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IIA implication: added Warren Smith reference, and panel data references from Wikipedia. Clarified how min-max is an adjustment of the voter's voting scale.

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Revision as of 16:45, 26 April 2024 (view source) Closed Limelike Curves (talk \| contribs) No edit summary Tag: Visual edit ← Older edit		Revision as of 21:18, 4 May 2024 (view source) Kristomun (talk \| contribs) (IIA implication: added Warren Smith reference, and panel data references from Wikipedia. Clarified how min-max is an adjustment of the voter's voting scale.) Newer edit →
Line 59: * A candidate can enter or drop out of the election without changing the result (unless they win in one of the cases). The second implication is ~~controversial~~strongly disputed for voting methods that pass IIA. It requires assuming voters won't change their ballots when the set of alternatives expands or contracts; with something like [[score voting]], this implies voters cannot [[normalization\|normalize]] their ballots. Another common example is if a candidate that a voter finds terrible enters the race, and is likely to win, then the voter has an incentive to do [[min-max voting]]. An example can be found at the Election Science site.<ref>https://www.electionscience.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/image03.jpg</ref> As an example of normalization, if a candidate that a voter finds terrible enters the race, and is likely to win, then the voter has an incentive to do [[min-max voting]] so as to keep the terrible candidate out of the race. The voter thus changes their scale so that the palatable candidates rate higher. An example can be found at the Election Science site.<ref>{{cite web\|url=https://www.electionscience.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/image03.jpg\|publisher=Center for Election Science\|title=Approval Voting Ballot}}</ref> This kind of rescaling must not happen if the second implication is to hold. Empirical results from panel data suggest that judgments are at least in part relative,<ref name="Stadt Kapteyn Geer 1985 pp. 179–187">{{cite journal \| last=Stadt \| first=Huib van de \| last2=Kapteyn \| first2=Arie \| last3=Geer \| first3=Sara van de \| title=The Relativity of Utility: Evidence from Panel Data \| journal=The Review of Economics and Statistics \| publisher=The MIT Press \| volume=67 \| issue=2 \| year=1985 \| issn=00346535 \| jstor=1924716 \| pages=179–187 \| url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/1924716 \| access-date=2024-04-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Richard H. \|last2=Diener \|first2=Ed \|last3=Wedell \|first3=Douglas H. \|title=Intrapersonal and Social Comparison Determinants of Happiness: A Range-Frequency Analysis \|journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology \|date=1989 \|volume=56 \|issue=3 \|pages=317–325 \|doi=10.1037/0022-3514.56.3.317 \|pmid=2926632 \|url=https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1989-18931-001}}</ref> which would weaken the second implication. In addition, [[Warren Smith]] suggested that [[Range voting]] would fail the implication.<ref>{{cite web\|url=https://rangevoting.org/WhyNotNormalize.html\|title=Why Range Votes should not be Automatically 'Normalized'\|quote=[Normalization] also forces a failure of 'independence of irrelevant alternatives.' In practice [Range voting] will largely fail anyway, but I think individuals should be able to vote independently for each candidate.\|last=Smith\|first=Warren D.\|website=The Center for Range Voting}}</ref> === Strategic implications ===