Informed majority coalition criterion: Difference between revisions

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Line 7: [[Range voting]] and the [[Borda count]] also pass the informed majority coalition criterion, even though they fail the [[majority criterion]]. [[Anti-plurality voting]] fails. == Relationship to Condorcification == The informed majority coalition criterion is of importance when considering the implications of modifying a method to always elect an absolute majority-strength Condorcet winner if one exists. Such a modification can never make a method susceptible to strategic manipulation in more elections than it was before being modified. However, such a modification can change what strategy it's vulnerable to in those elections where it's manipulable.{{Cn}}{{Clarify\|reason=How? Examples would be helpful!\|date=April 2024}} The informed majority coalition criterion is important to [[Condorcification]]. Specifically, Condorcifying any method that passes InfMC will ''never'' increase that method's susceptibility to strategic voting; there is no set of preferences where the base method was originally strategy-resistant, while the new method is not. In most cases, Condorcification outright reduces a method's manipulability.<ref name="Durand Mathieu Noirie 2016 j401" /> The argument behind this is simple: a majority under an InfMC system can always elect a Condorcet winner, if they exist, by voting strategically. This makes Condorcification a kind of [[declared strategy voting\|automatic strategy]]. However, such a modification ''can'' change what ''kind'' of strategy voters need to use in order to manipulate a method, in elections where it is manipulable. {{stub}}