Informed majority coalition criterion: Difference between revisions
Informed majority coalition criterion (view source)
Revision as of 23:10, 26 June 2023
, 10 months agoRemoved Approval voting from the list of example methods failing majority due to it being a matter of definition.
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It was independently defined by James Green-Armytage<ref name="Green-Armytage Tideman Cosman 2015 pp. 183–212">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage | first=James | last2=Tideman | first2=T. Nicolaus | last3=Cosman | first3=Rafael | title=Statistical evaluation of voting rules | journal=Social Choice and Welfare | publisher=Springer Science and Business Media LLC | volume=46 | issue=1 | date=2015-08-11 | issn=0176-1714 | doi=10.1007/s00355-015-0909-0 | pages=183–212 | url=https://jamesgreenarmytage.com/strategy-utility.pdf}}</ref> and Durand ''et al.''<ref name="Durand Mathieu Noirie 2016 j401">{{cite web | last=Durand | first=François | last2=Mathieu | first2=Fabien | last3=Noirie | first3=Ludovic | title=Can a Condorcet Rule Have a Low Coalitional Manipulability? | website=Archive ouverte HAL | volume=285 | date=2016-08-29 | url=https://hal.science/hal-01369877 | access-date=2023-06-26}}</ref> Any voting method passing the [[majority criterion]] automatically passes the informed majority criterion, since the majority can all their preferred candidate first to make that candidate win.
[[Range voting]]
The informed majority criterion is of importance when considering the implications of modifying a method to always elect an absolute majority-strength Condorcet winner if one exists. Such a modification can never make a method susceptible to strategic manipulation in more elections than it was before being modified. However, such a modification can change what strategy it's vulnerable to in those elections where it's manipulable.
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