Iterated Bucklin: Difference between revisions

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Iterated Bucklin (alternatively Bucklin-IRV, or BIRV) is a variant of [[Bucklin voting]] whereby the number of top preferences an individual ballot reveals at any point is a function of the winner of the count so far, as opposed to the standard [[Bucklin voting]] procedure by which all ballots reveal the same, progressively increasing number of top preferences until a quota of support is filled by at least one candidate.
Iterated Bucklin (alternatively Bucklin-IRV, or BIRV) is a variant of [[Bucklin voting]] whereby the number of top preferences an individual ballot reveals at any point is a function of the rank in which the ballot places the winner of the count so far. This modifies the standard [[Bucklin voting]] procedure by which all ballots reveal the same, progressively increasing number of top preferences until a quota of support is filled by at least one candidate.


Iterated Bucklin was [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002649.html proposed] by Etjon Basha in December 2020 as an attempt to produce a count that exhibits few practical violations of voting criteria (elicits the greatest degree of sincerity for voters) and the least degree of count complexity, at the cost of not formally meeting many criteria. Iterated Bucklin [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002649.html violates] [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]], [[Later no-harm criterion|Later-No-Harm]], [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002650.html Later-No-Help] and is not precinct summable. A preliminary simulation of the count’s propensity to violate various criteria was [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002650.html conducted] by Kevin Venzke.
Iterated Bucklin was [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002649.html proposed] by Etjon Basha in December 2020 as an attempt to produce a count that exhibits few practical violations of voting criteria (elicits the greatest degree of sincerity for voters) and the least degree of count complexity, at the cost of not formally meeting many criteria. Iterated Bucklin [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002649.html violates] [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]], [[Later no-harm criterion|Later-No-Harm]], [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002650.html Later-No-Help] and is not precinct summable. A preliminary simulation of the count’s propensity to violate various criteria was [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com//2020-December/002650.html conducted] by Kevin Venzke.
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== Purpose ==
== Purpose ==


Iterated Bucklin attempts to mimic the behavior of a rational Bucklin voter under conditions of an [[Repeated balloting|iterated count]] (hence the name), where after every round a chance is given to amend one’s vote once the winner until that point is presented, and with the count only ending once no voter wishes to further amend their vote. Whilst a true iterated count would be impractical under conditions of all but the smallest elections, Iterated Bucklin attempts to formalize a simulation of this process. It is hoped that a count that already produces a reasonable strategy on the voter’s behalf would hopefully lead to voters presenting relatively sincere rankings as in input.
Iterated Bucklin attempts to mimic the behavior of a rational Bucklin voter under conditions of an [[Repeated balloting|iterated count]] (hence the name), and specifically an iterated [[Approval voting|Approval Count]], where after every round a chance is given to amend one’s vote once the winner until that point is presented, and with the count only ending once no voter wishes to further amend their vote. Whilst a true iterated approval count would be impractical under conditions of all but the smallest elections, Iterated Bucklin attempts to formalize a simulation of this process. It is hoped that a count that already produces a reasonable strategy on the voter’s behalf would hopefully lead to voters presenting relatively sincere rankings as in input.


== Single-winner procedure ==
== Single-winner procedure ==