Kemeny–Young method: Difference between revisions
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order them the the opposite way as the given ranking. The distance is |
order them the the opposite way as the given ranking. The distance is |
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the sum across all such pairs. The ranking with the least distance wins. |
the sum across all such pairs. The ranking with the least distance wins. |
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The winning candidate is the top candidate in the winning ranking. |
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==Strategic Vulnerability== |
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==Example== |
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{{Tenn_voting_example}} |
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Consider the ranking Nashville>Chattanooga>Knoxville>Memphis. This ranking contains 6 orderings of pairs of candidates: |
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* Nashville>Chattanooga, for which 32% of the voters disagree. |
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* Nashville>Knoxville, for which 32% of the voters disagree. |
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* Nashville>Memphis, for which 42% of the voters disagree. |
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* Chattanooga>Knoxville, for which 17% of the voters disagree. |
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* Chattanooga>Memphis, for which 42% of the voters disagree. |
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* Knoxville>Memphis, for which 42% of the voters disagree. |
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The distance score for this ranking is 207. |
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It can be shown that this ranking is the one with the lowest distance score. Therefore, the winning ranking is Nashville>Chattanooga>Knoxville>Memphis, and so the winning candidate is Nashville. |
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==External links== |
==External links== |
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Some text of this article is derived with permission from [http://condorcet.org/emr/methods.shtml#Kemeny-Young Electoral Methods: Single Winner]. |
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[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]] |
[[Category:Single-winner voting systems]][[Category:Condorcet Methods]] |