Later-no-harm criterion: Difference between revisions
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Added probabilistic definition that follows from Woodall's definition of harm in the 1994 paper
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{{Wikipedia}}
The "'''later-no-harm criterion'''" criterion (sometimes referred to as "'''LNHarm'''"<ref>{{Cite web |title=Favorite Betrayal and Condorcet, and LNHarm |url=http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2022-April/003796.html|website=Election-methods mailing list archives |access-date=2022-04-22 |date=2022-04-20|first=K.|last=Venzke}}</ref>) posits that a voter giving an additional ranking or positive rating to a less-preferred candidate should not cause a higher ranked (or rated) candidate on that volter's ballot to lose. It was published in "[[Voting Matters]]" in 1994.<ref>Woodall, Douglas, Properties of Preferential Election Rules, [http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE3/P5.HTM Voting matters - Issue 3, December 1994]</ref> Its incompatibility with the Condorcet criterion was proven in "theorem 2" of [[Douglas Woodall]]'s 1997 paper on the subject.<ref name="Woodall97">{{cite journal | last=Woodall | first=Douglas R. | title=Monotonicity of single-seat preferential election rules | journal=Discrete Applied Mathematics | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=77 | issue=1 | year=1997 | issn=0166-218X | doi=10.1016/s0166-218x(96)00100-x | pages=81–98|url=http://scorevoting.net/Woodall97.pdf}}</ref>
== Definition ==
Here's a definition of the later-no-harm criterion:
{{definition|A voter giving an additional ranking or positive rating to a less-preferred candidate cannot cause a more-preferred candidate to lose.}}
For probabilistic methods, the later-no-harm criterion is:
<h2 class="left">Complying Methods</h2>▼
{{definition|A voter giving an additional ranking or positive rating to a less-preferred candidate cannot reduce the probability that a more-preferred candidate wins.}}
<p>'''Later-no-harm''' (usually LNH, but sometimes LNHa or LNHarm to avoid confusion with [[Later-no-help]]) is satisfied by [[IRV|Instant Runoff Voting]], [[Minmax|Minmax(pairwise opposition)]], and Douglas Woodall's [[Descending Solid Coalitions]] method. It is trivially satisfied by [[Plurality voting|First-Preference Plurality]] and [[Random Ballot]], since those methods do not usually regard lower preferences. Virtually every other method fails this criterion.</p>
<p>'''Later-no-harm''' is incompatible with the [[Condorcet Criterion|Condorcet criterion]].<ref name="Woodall97" /></p>
== Example ==
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<p>B is the [[Condorcet winner]], and would win in any [[Condorcet method]], and if using a [[rated method]], would win if given a high enough rating by all voters. But if the A-top voters [[Bullet voting|bullet vote]], then they can make A the winner in several voting methods, such as most [[:Category:Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods|Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods]] and likely in the rated methods. However, notice that to pass LNH in this situation, the majority of voters who [[Pairwise beat|prefer]] B over A have to have their preferences ignored; in a method like [[IRV]], that means that the C-top voters may have to choose between supporting C or using [[Favorite Betrayal]] to help B win. Essentially, passing LNH ensures voters never have to worry about their later preferences hurting them, but it can at times force them to lie about their higher preferences.</p>
'''Later-no-harm''' guarantees that the method will not use a voter's lower preferences to elect a candidate who that voter likes less than the candidate that would have been elected if this voter had kept his lower preferences a secret.
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=== Preventing compromise ===
This criterion is equivalent to the criterion that the system is non-compromising in that it will never elect a compromise (i.e. a [[Utilitarian winner]] or [[Condorcet winner]].) This is not universally desired so it cannot be claimed that this
=== Not reflecting voter preferences ===
One argument against LNH is that it can result in arbitrary changes in election outcomes based on voter preferences.
A counterargument would be that the example given involves two major candidates, L and R, and because the voters' [[pairwise preference]]<nowiki/>s between the two didn't change (rather, their preference between L/R and C changed), no change should occur in who was the better of the two. This argument is an example of how those against LNH are often in favor of [[rated method]]<nowiki/>s, where the strength of each of the voter's pairwise preferences are connected (i.e. the fact that some voters increased their support for a major candidate in relation to an irrelevant candidate is argued to mean that their strength of preference between the two major candidates ought to be weakened), rather than [[ranked method]]<nowiki/>s, which are often based on the idea that a voter's pairwise preferences are independent and maximal (i.e. [[:Category:Pairwise counting-based voting methods]]).
== Notes ==
=== Misleading name ===
Though LNH is often touted as preventing voters from being hurt by indicating later preferences, in truth it only prevents voters from hurting a candidate they ranked higher when they do this.
== References ==
<
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
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