Majority: Difference between revisions

Methods which pass criterion 1 only include [[First-past-the-post electoral system|Plurality]], [[approval voting|Approval]], [[Cardinal Ratings]], and the [[Borda count]]. Although it is always '''possible''' in these systems for a coordinated majority to elect their preferred candidate, coordination may be difficult. For example, take an electorate with preferences as follows:

In a plurality election, a clear majority (60-40) prefer both A and B to C. But unless A and B voters know whether to vote for A or whether to vote for B, C may win a plurality of votes. In addition, voters for A and B voters may play a game of "chicken", refusing to vote for the other, because they believe their candidate should win.

However, IRV doesn't pass the [[Condorcet criterion]]. In an election with preferences as follows:

Looking at this election pairwise, there are three majorities: a majority (69 to 31) prefer B to A, a majority (69-31) prefer C to A, and a majority (60-40) prefer B to C. If you were to award the title "majority winner" to any candidate, B has the fairest claim to that title, as (different) majorities of voters prefer B to each other candidate. However, in IRV, B is eliminated first and does not win.