Majority: Difference between revisions
Content added Content deleted
No edit summary |
(→Notes) |
||
Line 113: | Line 113: | ||
== Notes == |
== Notes == |
||
⚫ | [[ISDA]] implies several of the criteria mentioned above. When there is a [[Mutual majority criterion|mutual majority]] and a minority with a preference among the mutual majority's preferred candidates, the ISDA-based reasoning for deciding who to elect can be thought of as eliminating everyone not in the mutual majority, checking if there is a new mutual majority set, and then repeating. Taking the above example: |
||
⚫ | |||
<br /> |
|||
: 31 A > B > C |
: 31 A > B > C |
||
: |
:29 B > C > A |
||
: 40 C > B > A |
: 40 C > B > A |
||
There is a mutual majority of 69% of voters for B and C, so by ISDA, A can be eliminated. Then, the example becomes:<blockquote>60 B > C |
|||
40 C > B</blockquote>The 31 A>B>C and 29 B>C>A voters fuse into one coalition with A gone, and so there is now a majority who put B as their 1st choice, and because ISDA implies the [[Majority criterion|majority criterion]], B wins. |
|||
A majority is a Droop [[quota]] in the single-winner case. |
|||
<br /> |
|||
[[Category:Voting theory]] |
[[Category:Voting theory]] |
||
{{fromwikipedia}} |
{{fromwikipedia}} |