Majority Approval, Minimum Pairwise Opposition: Difference between revisions

m
no edit summary
imported>KVenzke
No edit summary
 
mNo edit summary
 
(5 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Line 1:
'''Majority Approval, Minimum Pairwise Opposition''' or '''MAMPO''' is one method devised by [[Kevin Venzke]] for the purpose of showing that the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]], the [[Strong Defensive Strategy criterion]], and the [[Strategy-Free criterion]] are mutually compatible.
 
Another method with these properties is [[Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval]].
Line 8:
The ''score'' for candidate ''X'' against candidate ''Y'' is equal to the number of voters ranking ''X'' above ''Y''. The ''max score'' of candidate ''X'' is the largest score of any other candidate against ''X''.
 
If fewer than one candidatenobody is approved by more than half of the voters, then the candidate approved by the most voters is elected.
 
Otherwise, the candidate with the lowest max score, who is approved by more than half of the voters, is elected.
Line 16:
 
It fails [[Strategic nomination|Clone-Winner]], the [[Generalized Strategy-Free criterion]], the [[Condorcet criterion]], the [[Smith set|Smith criterion]], [[Participation criterion|Participation]], the [[Majority criterion|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], and [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no-harm]].
 
[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]]
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:No-favorite-betrayal electoral systems]]
1,204

edits