Majority Choice Approval: Difference between revisions
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All of the methods are [[Summability criterion|summable]] for counting at the precinct level. Only MCA-IR actually requires a matrix (or, possibly two counting rounds), and is thus "[[Summability criterion|summable for k=2]]"; the others require only O(N) tallies, and are thus "[[Summability criterion|summable for k=1]]".
MCA can also satisfy:
* [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives]]
* MCA-IR satisfies [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]] if the [[pairwise champion]] is visible on the ballots{{Clarify|date=April 2024}} and would beat at least one other candidate by an absolute majority. It is satisfied by MCA-AR if at least half the voters at least approve the PC in the first round of voting. These methods also satisfy the [[Strategy-Free criterion]] if an SFC-compliant method such as [[Schulze]] is used to pick at least one of the finalists. All other MCA versions, however, fail the Condorcet and strategy-free criteria.
* The [[later-no-help criterion]] and the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]] are satisfied by MCA-P. They're also satisfied by MCA-AR if MCA-P is used to pick the two finalists.
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