Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval: Difference between revisions

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Line 1: '''Majority Defeat Disqualification Approval''' or '''MDDA''' is a method devised by [[Kevin Venzke]] for the purpose of showing that the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]], [[Strategy-Free criterion]], and [[Strong Defensive Strategy criterion]] are mutually compatible. The name was given by [[Mike Ossipoff]]. This method can be viewed as a variant of [[Improved Condorcet Approval]]. Another method with the above properties is [[Majority Approval, Minimum Pairwise Opposition]] ([[MAMPO]]). ==Procedure== Line 6 ⟶ 10: A candidate is ''dominated'' if more than half of the voters rank some other candidate strictly above him. ~~Sort~~All ~~the~~dominated candidates soare ~~that all undominated candidates~~eliminated, ifunless ~~any~~this ~~exist,~~would ~~come before~~eliminate all ~~dominated candidates. Within each group, sort of~~ the candidates ~~in descending order of approval~~. Of remaining candidates, the one approved by the most voters is elected. ~~Elect the first candidate in the resulting ranking.~~ ==Criteria== '''MDDA''' satisfies the [[Favorite Betrayal criterion]], [[Strategy-Free criterion]], the [[Strong Defensive Strategy criterion]] (and [[Minimal Defense criterion]]), and [[Monotonicity criterion\|monotonicity~~]], and (''check this'') the [[Plurality criterion~~]]. It fails [[Strategic nomination\|Clone-Winner]], the [[Plurality criterion]], the [[Generalized Strategy-Free criterion]], the [[Condorcet criterion]], the [[Smith set\|Smith criterion]], [[Participation criterion\|Participation]], the [[Majority criterion\|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], and [[Later-no-harm criterion\|Later-no-harm]].▼ ==Links== ▲It fails [[Strategic nomination\|Clone-Winner]], the [[Generalized Strategy-Free criterion]], the [[Condorcet criterion]], the [[Smith set\|Smith criterion]], [[Participation criterion\|Participation]], the [[Majority criterion\|Majority criterion for solid coalitions]], and [[Later-no-harm criterion\|Later-no-harm]]. [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-June/016374.html Method is first proposed on EM, with properties proven (Jun 21 2005)] [http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-June/016381.html Mike Ossipoff names the method] *[https://www.rangevoting.org/FBCsurvey.html Warren D. Smith describes other favorite betrayal compliant methods that use majority defeat disqualification - MDD-Range and MDD-Summed-Ranks] [[Category:Single-winner voting methods]] ~~''Work in progress.''~~ [[Category:Ranked voting methods]] [[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]] [[Category:No-favorite-betrayal electoral systems]]