Marginal Ranked Approval Voting: Difference between revisions
Update link to Rob LeGrand's online voting calculator
imported>Araucaria (Add link to Approval Sorted Margins, note that method is symmetric) |
(Update link to Rob LeGrand's online voting calculator) |
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*** If no such Z exists, X is not marginally defeated by Y.
** Approval(Y) - Approval(X) > Approval(X) - Approval(Z)
*** This means that Y's approval-margin defeat strength over X is
*** Note that both sides of the inequality are negative.
*** The inequality can be arranged to Approval(X) < (Approval(Z) + Approval(Y))/2; that is, X's approval is
*** Another rearrangement of the inequality is:
**** Approval(X) - Approval(Y) < Approval(Z) - Approval(X)
*** Which means that X's approval is closer to the approval of the lower-approved candidate Y (who has a clear upward defeat of X) than to the higher approved candidate Z (who defeats Y).
*'''Marginal losers''': Set of all marginally defeated candidates
*'''Strong set''': set of candidates neither strongly nor marginally defeated
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== Example ==
Here's a set of preferences taken from Rob LeGrand's [
The ranked ballots:
Line 187 ⟶ 190:
We find strong preference votes by totaling only those winning votes that cross the approval cutoff. So sp(Dave>Brad)=213 > sp(Brad>Abby)=98. Brad is still marginally defeated by Dave and Abby still wins.
[[Category:Condorcet
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