McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem: Difference between revisions
Wrote rough summary.
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See [[w:McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem]]
The theorem roughly implies that spatial models in more than one dimension can create [[Condorcet cycle]]s, even when every voter prefers closer candidates to more distant ones. In one dimension, there's always a [[Condorcet winner]] under these conditions, but it stops being true with more dimensions.
Note that though the theorem holds that the [[Smith set]] will generally contain most of the alternatives, evidence seems to suggest otherwise in real-world political settings. See [[Condorcet paradox]] for more information.
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