Minimal Defense criterion: Difference between revisions
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The '''Minimal Defense criterion''' for [[voting system|voting systems]] is similar to and was inspired by the [[Strong Defensive Strategy criterion]]. It is stronger than the SDSC and implies it.<ref name="VenzkeImpl">{{cite web|url=http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/080317.html|title=A method satisfying Minimal Defense and much Later-no-harm|website=Election-methods mailing list archives|date=2005-03-05|last=Venzke|first=K.}}</ref>
This definition is most similar to that of [[SDSC]]. Another definition suggested by Eppley makes reference only to the cast votes:
It's also required that the method permits voters to submit complete or incomplete rankings. In particular, truncation must be an option: It's not adequate for the method to require that the voters rank ''X'' strictly ''below'' every other candidate.
Methods satisfying '''Minimal Defense''' include Steve Eppley's own [[Maximize Affirmed Majorities]] method, [[
In a method that satisfies '''Minimal Defense''', when a majority of the voters prefer candidate ''A'' to candidate ''B'', all that these voters need to do to avoid the election of ''B'' is to not give ''B'' a ranking over another candidate.
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In particular, even if all of the voters preferring ''A'' to ''B'' each prefer many other different candidates to ''A'', '''Minimal Defense''' guarantees that these voters don't need to insincerely rank ''A'' above or even equal to these other candidates to ensure that ''B'' won't be elected.
==
<references />
* [http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley The Maximize Affirmed Majorities voting procedure (MAM)]▼
== External links ==
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[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
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