Mutual majority criterion: Difference between revisions

49 C</blockquote>Despite B being preferred by an absolute majority over C, and the only candidate preferred by any voters in that absolute majority over or equally to B being A (with no voters in the majority preferring anyone over A), the mutual majority criterion doesn't guarantee that either A or B must win. It has been argued that to avoid the [[Chicken dilemma]], C must win here (and C would win in some mutual majority-passing methods, such as [[IRV]], which is often claimed to resist the chicken dilemma), but methods that do so have a spoiler effect, since if A drops out, B must win by the majority (and thus mutual majority) criterion. All major [[:Category:Defeat-dropping Condorcet methods|defeat-dropping Condorcet methods]] elect B here, since they have the weakest pairwise defeat.

 

 

==References==