Pareto efficiency: Difference between revisions

m
no edit summary
No edit summary
mNo edit summary
 
(3 intermediate revisions by one other user not shown)
Line 1:
{{wikipedia|Pareto efficiency}}
The'''Pareto efficiency''' (frequently referred to as the "'''Pareto criterion'''" or unanimity"'''Unanimity criterion'''" in the [[election method]] context) is a basic criterion for evaluating [[voting system|voting systems]]. It can be defined in this way:
 
{{definition|If every voter prefers alternative X over alternative Y, then the systemelection method prefers X over Y}}
 
This criterion is important in the context of [[Arrow's impossibility theorem]], since it was one of Arrow's criteria in the theorem.
 
Virtually every devised election method satisfies this criterion. An example of a method which would fail it would be ''Random Candidate'', where some candidate is elected at random, regardless of the submitted votes.
Line 11 ⟶ 12:
'''Independence of Pareto-dominated alternatives (IPDA)''' says that if one option (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will win the election if Y is Pareto-dominated (using the second version of the criterion).
 
The Pareto criterion is Hare-[[PSC]] in the single-winner case of Hare-[[PSC]].
 
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
1,196

edits