Proportionality for Solid Coalitions: Difference between revisions

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'''Proportionality for Solid Coalitions''' ('''PSC''') is a criterion for proportional methods requiring that sufficiently-sized groups of voters (solid coalitions) always elect a proportional number of candidates from their set of mutually most-preferred candidates. In general, any time any group of voters prefers any set of candidates over all others, a certain minimum number of candidates from that set must win to pass the criterion, and the same must hold if the preferred set of candidates for a group can be shrunk or enlargened. It is the main conceptualization of Proportional Representation generally used throughout the world ([[Party List]] and [[STV]] pass versions of it.) The two main types of PSC are k-PSC (aka. Hare-PSC, a condition requiring a solid coalition comprising k Hare quotas to be always elect at least k most-preferred candidates) and k+1-PSC (aka. Droop-PSC, which is the same as Hare-PSC but holding for Droop quotas instead).
 
Any voting method that collects enough information to distinguish solid coalitions (generally scored or ranked methods, since preferences can be inferred from their ballots) can be forced to be PSC-compliant by first electing the proportionally correct number of candidates from each solid coalition before doing anything else.
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There can be quota overlaps when assigning PSC claims; suppose a group constituting 80% of a quota of voters vote A>B>C>D, another group of 80% of a quota vote B>A>C>D, and another group of 50% of a quota vote C>A=B=D. Then, 2 candidates must be elected from the set (A, B, C, D), since in total 2.1 quotas mutually most prefer that set, but a further constraint is that 1 candidate must win from within (A, B), since 1.6 quotas mutually most prefer them. It would not satisfy PSC if the final winner set had neither A or B in it in other words, even if it had C and D.
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== Generalised solid coalitions ==