Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination: Difference between revisions

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'''Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination''' (abbreviated as '''RCIPE''' which is pronounced "recipe") is an election vote-counting method that uses ranked ballots and eliminates '''pairwise losing candidates''' (elimination-round-specific [[Condorcet loser criterion|Condorcet losers]]) when they occur, and otherwise eliminates the candidate who currently has the fewestsmallest top-choice countscount.
 
 
This method modifies [[Instant-Runoff Voting|instant runoff voting]] (IRV) by adding the elimination of Condorcet losers. This addition would have prevented the failure of instant-runoff voting to elect the most popular candidate in the 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont.
This method modifies [[Instant-Runoff Voting|instant runoff voting]] (IRV) by adding the elimination of pairwise losing candidates. This addition reduces the failure rate for the [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives]] (IIA), which is the kind of failure that occurred in the [[2009 Burlington mayoral election|2009 mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont]].  This check for pairwise losing candidates considers all the marks on all the ballots, which contrasts with IRV, which does not consider all the marks on all the ballots.
 
This method further modifies simple IRV by specifying how to handle ballots on which the voter has marked more than one candidate at the same ranking level.
 
The RCIPE STV method extends the single-winner RCIPE method to fill multiple equivalent seats.
 
== Description ==
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If an elimination round has a Condorcet loser (a '''pairwise losing candidate'''), this candidate is eliminated as the least-popular candidate. The Condorcet loser is the candidate who would lose every one-on-one contest against each and every other candidate.
 
If an elimination round does not have a Condorcet loser, the candidate who has the fewestsmallest top-choice countscount is eliminated. A candidate's top-choice count is the count of how many ballots rank that candidate highest compared to the other remaining candidates.
 
Unlike instant-runoff voting, which ends when a candidate reaches majority support, the eliminations continue until only a single candidate remains.
 
The last candidate to be eliminated is the runner-up candidate. If this counting method is used in the primary election of a major political party, and if the runoff or "general" election is counted in a way that is not vulnerable to vote splitting, then ideally the runner-up candidate would move to the runoff or general election along with the primary-election winner. SmallVery small political parties would not qualify to move their runner-up candidate to the runoff or general election.
 
Importantly, the runner-up candidate does not deserve to win any kind of elected seat. Instead, the RCIPE STV version should be used for elections that fill multiple seats, such as on a non-partisan city council or a dual-member legislative district.
Importantly, this method is not suitable for filling multiple seats, such as on a city council or a multi-member district. This means the runner-up candidate does not deserve to win any kind of elected seat.
 
=== Ballot Robustness ===
To avoid spoiled ballots in elections where the voter uses a pen or marker to mark their paper ballot, more than one candidate can be marked at the same ranking level. When an elimination round involves a ballot that has two or more remaining highest-ranked candidates, thethat ballot's single vote is split equally among these candidates. This splitting of a single vote can be done using fractions or decimal numbers that do not exceed a total of one vote per ballot. If a law does not permit the use of fractions or decimal numbers, the ballots that have the same shared ranking can be distributed uniformly among the same-ranked candidates, such as alternating which candidate gets each successive ballot on which the same two candidates are highest-ranked at the same level. Regardless of which method is used, each elimination round re-calculates which ballots support which candidates.
 
Also to avoid spoiled ballots, if a voter marks more than one ranking level for the same candidate, only the highest-marked ranking level is used during counting.
 
IfThe thechoice of how to handle a ballot on which a voter does not mark any ovals for a candidate depends on how write-in candidates are handled. If write-in candidates are not allowed, thatan unmarked candidate iscan be ranked at the ranking level ''below'' the lowest ranking level, asshown ifon the voterballot. markedIf thewrite-in ovalcandidates forare allowed, an unmarked candidate can be ranked ''at'' the lowest ranking level shown on the ballot, and that level also would be used for a write-in candidate whose name does not appear on that ballot.
 
The ranking level below the lowest ranking level is reserved for write-in candidates whose names do not appear on the ballot being counted.
 
== Tie breaker ==
If two or more candidates have the same smallest top-choice count, this tie is resolved by eliminating the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of not-yet-eliminated tied candidates who are ranked above that candidate, and adding thosethese numbers across all the ballots.
 
If there is a tie for the largest pairwise opposition count, this tie is resolved by eliminating the candidate with the smallest pairwise support count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of not-yet-eliminated tied candidates who are ranked above that candidate, and adding these numbers across all the ballots.
 
Note that the pairwise opposition count and pairwise support count are calculated using only the candidates who are currently tied. This means that ballot information about eliminated candidates and not-tied candidates is ignored when resolving ties.
If there is a tie for this largest pairwise opposition count, the method eliminates the candidate with the smallest pairwise support count, which similarly counts support rather than opposition.
 
If there is also a tie for the smallest pairwise support count, then those candidates are tied and another tie-breaking method is needed to identify which of the still-tied candidates to eliminate.
 
== Example ==
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* [[Condorcet loser criterion|Condorcet loser]]: pass
* [[Majority criterion|Majority]]: failpass
* [[Majority loser criterion|Majority loser]]: failpass
* Mutual majority: [[Sequential loser-elimination method#Criteria|pass]]
* Resolvable: pass
* Polytime: pass
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* [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]: fail
* [[Majority criterion|Majority]]: fail
* [[Majority loser criterion|Majority loser]]: fail
* Mutual majority: fail
* [[Smith criterion|Smith]]/[[ISDA]]: fail
* Cloneproof: fail
* LIIA: fail
* IIA: fail
* Cloneproof: fail
* Monotone: fail
* Consistency: fail
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* Participation: fail
* No favorite betrayal: fail
It is* [[Summability criterion|summableSummable]]: with O(N<sup>2</sup>).fail
 
== RCIPE STV ==
 
RCIPE STV is the multi-winner version of the RCIPE method, which means it functions like the [[Single transferable vote|Single Transferable Vote]] (STV) for electing multiple legislators within the same district, and electing non-partisan members of a city council. RCIPE STV offers these advantages over plain STV:
 
* A voter can mark two or more candidates at the same ranking level. This flexibility allows voters to fully rank all the candidates, including the ability to rank the voter's most-disliked candidate lower than all other candidates, even when the number of ranking levels is fewer than the number of candidates.
*The counting process considers all the marks on all the ballots. This deeper counting is done when identifying pairwise losing candidates. It prevents a voter's ballot transfer from getting stuck on an unpopular pairwise-losing candidate while other ballots determine which other candidates win seats and which other candidates get eliminated.
*Changing the ballot-counting sequence does not change who wins. In contrast, plain STV can elect different winners if the ballots are supplied in a different sequence.
These advantages occur because:
* Vote transfer counts are re-calculated after each candidate is elected.
* If a counting round does not elect a candidate, the pairwise losing candidate is eliminated.  If there is no pairwise losing candidate, the candidate with the lowest vote transfer count is eliminated.
 
* During pairwise counting all the ballots are counted, but the ballots that have zero influence do not contribute any votes to either side of the one-on-one matches.
* If a full-influence ballot ranks two or more remaining (not-yet-elected and not-yet-eliminated) candidates at the same preference level, and if there are not any remaining candidates ranked higher on this ballot, then this ballot is grouped with other similar (although not necessarily identical) ballots and their influence counts are equally split among the remaining candidates who are ranked at that shared preference level.  For example, if candidates A and B have been elected or eliminated, and a ballot ranks candidate A highest and ranks candidates B, C, and D at the next-highest level, and another ballot ranks candidate B highest and ranks candidates A, C, and D at the next-highest level, then one of these two ballots transfers to candidate C and the other ballot transfers to candidate D.
*In a counting round that ends with a candidate getting elected, the specific supporting ballots that are changed from full influence to zero influence are chosen to be equally spaced from one another in the supplied ballot sequence, without including the already-zero-influence ballots in the equal-spacing calculations. This rule causes the calculations to yield the same winners if the same ballots were supplied in a different sequence.
*Ties are resolved using pairwise elimination.
 
If a jurisdiction has laws that allow a ballot to have decimal influence amounts that range between zero and one, the above rules can be simplified to use decimal influence values.
 
== External links ==
 
* [https://github.com/cpsolver/VoteFair-ranking-cpp/blob/master/rcipe_stv.cpp RCIPE_STV software that calculates RCIPE and RCIPE STV methods]
It is [[Summability criterion|summable]] with O(N<sup>2</sup>).
 
[[Category:Sequential loser-elimination methods]]
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