Relevant rating: Difference between revisions

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(Simplified secondary method)
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In Relevant rating, when comparing the total number of ballots approving a candidate X at and above a rating R to a contrasting number, instead of using the ''total number of ballots'' rating X below R as that contrasting number (as in MJ), we use the maximum approval for ''any candidate'' on those complementary ballots. As in [[IBIFA]], this is what renders the method independent of irrelevant ballots, because ballots that don't change the complementary approval winner won't change the relevant rating.
In Relevant rating, when comparing the total number of ballots approving a candidate X at and above a rating R to a contrasting number, instead of using the ''total number of ballots'' rating X below R as that contrasting number (as in MJ), we use the maximum approval for ''any candidate'' on those complementary ballots. As in [[IBIFA]], this is what renders the method independent of irrelevant ballots, because ballots that don't change the complementary approval winner won't change the relevant rating.


Using a similar process, we could also find the Relevant Rating winner without having to create a full Relevant Ratings ranking of candidates.
Using a similar and much simpler process, we could also find the Relevant Rating winner without having to create a full Relevant Ratings ranking of candidates.


# Initialize the rating level R to MAXRATING
# Initialize the rating level R to MAXRATING
# Initialize candidate totals, '''T(X)''', to zero
# Find all qualifying candidates Q whose total approval at and above rating R ('''TA(Q,R)''') is greater than the maximum approval for any candidate C on ballots that rate Q below R ('''TCA(Q,C,R)'''). If there are no qualifying candidates, then decrement R and repeat.
# Initialize '''TCA(X,C)''' to the highest approval for any candidate on ballots that rate X below R
# If there is more than one qualifying candidate Q, then additionally check whether each Q's total approval ''above'' rating R (that is, Q's total approval for the previous round's rating, TA(Q,R+1)) also exceeds their corresponding current round TCA(Q,C,R). The additionally qualifying candidate with the highest TA(Q,R+1) is the winner. Otherwise [that is, the additional qualification is not met], the candidate with the highest TA(Q,R) is the winner.
# Repeat until a winner is found:
# If all approval ratings above zero have been exhausted, the candidate with the highest total approval is the winner.
## For each candidate X, add ballots rating X at level R to T(X)
## Is '''T(X) > TCA(X,C)'''? If so X is a member of the current qualifying set
## If the current qualifying set has at least one member Q, the candidate with the highest T(Q) is the winner
## Otherwise, decrement R by one
## Set TCA(X,C) to the highest approval for any candidate on ballots that rate X below the new R
## For each candidate X, is '''T(X) > TCA(X,C)''' (using new TCA(X,C))? If so, then X is a member of a new qualifying set.
## If the new qualifying set has at least one member Q', then the candidate with the highest T(Q') is the winner.

Note that after R is decremented to zero, the new TCA(X,C) will be zero. So the final step after R is zero will always find an approval winner.


[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]