River: Difference between revisions
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'''River''' is a cloneproof monotonic [[Condorcet method#Different ambiguity resolution methods|Condorcet ambiguity resolution method]] with similarities to both [[Ranked Pairs]] and [[Schulze method|Schulze]], but when cycles exist, can in rare cases find a different winner than either of the other two methods.
It was first proposed in 2004 by [[User:Heitzig-j|Jobst Heitzig]] on the [[Election-methods mailing list]].<ref name="River initial">{{cite web | title=Hello again -- and a new method for you! | website=
Jobst later refined the definition to be more similar to Ranked Pairs.<ref name="River concise">{{cite web | title=River method -- updated summary | website=
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The result is that only sufficient defeat information to determine the winner is included.
Because not all defeats are processed, the social ordering is not linear—in general, it is a tree (or river) diagram, with the victor at the base of the river.
==Examples==
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==Criterion compliances==
River passes [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]], [[Smith set|Smith]], the [[monotonicity criterion]]<ref name="Votedesc"/>, independence of clones, and independence of Pareto-dominated alternatives.<ref name="IPDA">{{cite web | title=River method - a refinement, minor computational evidence, and a generalized IPDA criterion ISDA | website=
In addition, River passes Heitzig's independence of strongly dominated alternatives criterion, which is weaker than independence of uncovered alternatives and stronger than independence of Pareto-dominated alternatives.
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==References==
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