SODA voting (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval): Difference between revisions
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# Leaders of minority factions would have an appropriate voice for their concerns, although power would ultimately reside with any majority coalition which exists. |
# Leaders of minority factions would have an appropriate voice for their concerns, although power would ultimately reside with any majority coalition which exists. |
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# This should be generally acceptable to current politicians, who are winners in a Plurality two-party system. Plurality-style voting still works just fine, and if most votes are for major parties, this system will cleanly allow a major party to win, in many cases without going to the delegation round (especially if the major-party candidates do not pre-announce delegation preferences, thus preventing an extorting minor party from demanding their delegated votes). |
# This should be generally acceptable to current politicians, who are winners in a Plurality two-party system. Plurality-style voting still works just fine, and if most votes are for major parties, this system will cleanly allow a major party to win, in many cases without going to the delegation round (especially if the major-party candidates do not pre-announce delegation preferences, thus preventing an extorting minor party from demanding their delegated votes). |
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(Note: if major-party candidates oppose SODA because it might force them to negotiate somewhat for minor-party delegated votes, a SODA supporter could respond "He just wants the only smoke-filled room to be the one inside his skull.") |
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== Criticism and responses == |
== Criticism and responses == |
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=== "There are other systems which are better in some ways." === |
=== "There are other systems which are better in some ways." === |
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Also, since candidate's delegations must accord with their pre-declared preferences, there no opportunity for strategy as long as those preferences were honestly-declared. And the preferences do not represent back-room wheeling and dealing; they are public positions. The various risks of dishonestly declaring one's preference clearly outweigh the unlikely benefits they'd give. |
Also, since candidate's delegations must accord with their pre-declared preferences, there no opportunity for strategy as long as those preferences were honestly-declared. And the preferences do not represent back-room wheeling and dealing; they are public positions. The various risks of dishonestly declaring one's preference clearly outweigh the unlikely benefits they'd give. |
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Simple response to a ''candidate'' who makes this argument: "He just wants the only smoke-filled room to be the one inside his skull." That is, minority factions '''should''' have a seat at the table, as long as everything is done transparently. In SODA, all vote totals, preference orders, and final delegation decisions are known; in the end, that's not a smoke-filled room, it's a transparent seat at the table, with a just degree of power which is derived from the people. |
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=== "Why go to the trouble of pre-announced rankings and a second round? Why not just have candidates pre-announce their delegated approvals?" === |
=== "Why go to the trouble of pre-announced rankings and a second round? Why not just have candidates pre-announce their delegated approvals?" === |