SODA voting (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval): Difference between revisions
Content added Content deleted
| Line 10: | Line 10: | ||
# If any candidate has an absolute majority at this point, or cannot possibly be beaten by any other candidate using the delegable votes and candidate rankings available, then they win immediately. |
# If any candidate has an absolute majority at this point, or cannot possibly be beaten by any other candidate using the delegable votes and candidate rankings available, then they win immediately. |
||
# There is a brief period - perhaps a week or two - for candidates to analyse and negotiate based on these preliminary results. (Actually, in the broad majority of cases, the correct strategies for all candidates and the resulting winner will already be obvious. Usually, all candidates except this winner would concede as soon as preliminary results are announced. However, for the occasional candidate inclined to act irrationally in a way that matters - say, by not delegating to an ally, even though the alternative is to see an enemy elected - this interim period would give them a chance to rethink things and come into reason.) |
# There is a brief period - perhaps a week or two - for candidates to analyse and negotiate based on these preliminary results. (Actually, in the broad majority of cases, the correct strategies for all candidates and the resulting winner will already be obvious. Usually, all candidates except this winner would concede as soon as preliminary results are announced. However, for the occasional candidate inclined to act irrationally in a way that matters - say, by not delegating to an ally, even though the alternative is to see an enemy elected - this interim period would give them a chance to rethink things and come into reason.) |
||
# All candidates |
# All candidates publicly delegate their votes, in descending order of the number of delegable votes they have; that is, they choose an N, and add their "delegable vote" total to the approval totals of their top N favorites as announced in step one. They may choose N=0 - that is, not delegate their vote to anyone. They may not choose N=(number of candidates) - that is, delegate their votes to everyone. If they declared a tie in their preferences, they must either delegate to all candidates whom they included in that tie (as well as anyone they ranked above that), or none of them. (Note: The descending order prevents a weaker candidate from giving an ultimatum to a stronger candidate and thus strengthens the strategic equilibrium of any pairwise champion there is.) |
||
# The highest total wins. |
# The highest total wins. |
||
| Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
Optional rule 4.5 (between 4 and 5): If any candidate has less than 5% (of the total votes) as delegable votes, and is not one of the top two in total votes, then those votes are automatically delegated to the first candidate on their approval list who has more than 5% delegable votes or more than 20% total votes. They will be further delegated to the largest sequence from their original candidate's preference order which is contained in their receiving candidate's delegations. So if they originally went to A who preferred alphabetically, then and they're passed to D who delegates to BCEGH, they'll end up approving ABCDE. This rule prevents giving excessive kingmaker power to a tiny faction. Note that all delegation is still non-exclusive, approval-style. |
Optional rule 4.5 (between 4 and 5): If any candidate has less than 5% (of the total votes) as delegable votes, and is not one of the top two in total votes, then those votes are automatically delegated to the first candidate on their approval list who has more than 5% delegable votes or more than 20% total votes. They will be further delegated to the largest sequence from their original candidate's preference order which is contained in their receiving candidate's delegations. So if they originally went to A who preferred alphabetically, then and they're passed to D who delegates to BCEGH, they'll end up approving ABCDE. This rule prevents giving excessive kingmaker power to a tiny faction. Note that all delegation is still non-exclusive, approval-style. |
||
This rule would help make this system more attractive to major-party politicians. But it's a principled rule, not just a sop to the major parties. Consider the "kingmaker" case: in a basically 50/50 split, some tiny party has the balance of votes, and manages to extract concessions far bigger than their base of support justifies, just in order to [not] delegate those votes. |
This rule would help make this system more attractive to major-party politicians. But it's a principled rule, not just a sop to the major parties. Consider the "kingmaker" case: in a basically 50/50 split, some tiny party has the balance of votes, and manages to extract concessions far bigger than their base of support justifies, just in order to [not] delegate those votes. That's unjust, and this rule would prevent it. So this rule is recommended whenever people will tolerate the complexity. |
||
5% is a good cutoff here; that's tens of millions of voters nationally, and enough to deserve a voice. It shouldn't be too high, because this rule is effectively taking power away from voters; that's only justified if the faction is so small that the power is not legitimate, and so it's better to err a bit on the small side if anything. But under 5% - that is, under 10% of the winning coalition - doesn't deserve kingmaker power. |
|||
==== More-sophisticated final win criterion ==== |
==== More-sophisticated final win criterion ==== |
||