SODA voting (Simple Optionally-Delegated Approval): Difference between revisions
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== Criteria Compliance == |
== Criteria Compliance == |
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SODA itself does not satisfy [[monotonicity]] due to a complicated and implausible scenario involving 5 or more candidates. However, a slightly-modified version in which, before the delegated assignments, candidates can self-assign a penalty to be assessed at the end of the delegated assignment round, does. This modified version, MODA, is effectively identical to SODA for any plausible real-world election. |
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MODA satisfies [[monotonicity]], the [[favorite betrayal criterion]], the [[majority criterion]], and the [[mutual majority criterion]]. Depending on assumptions and definitions, it can pass the [[Condorcet loser criterion]]. |
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It does not satisfy the [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] criterion in general, but it does if the "irrelevant alternative" is assumed to delegate votes in the same way as any candidate whose delegable votes they supplant. Similarly, it can only pass the [[participation]] and [[consistency]] criteria if it is assumed that candidate delegations do not change. These assumptions are ''not'' realistic, but they do show that the method is in some sense "close to" passing these criteria. |
It does not satisfy the [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]] criterion in general, but it does if the "irrelevant alternative" is assumed to delegate votes in the same way as any candidate whose delegable votes they supplant. Similarly, it can only pass the [[participation]] and [[consistency]] criteria if it is assumed that candidate delegations do not change. These assumptions are ''not'' realistic, but they do show that the method is in some sense "close to" passing these criteria. |
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In any case where honest delegation could show a majority Condorcet winner, such delegation forms a strong Nash equilibrium. This shows that in general, strategic refusal to delegate is likely to fail. |
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=== Condorcet criterion (includes highly technical discussion) === |
=== Condorcet criterion (includes highly technical discussion) === |
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