STAR voting: Difference between revisions
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In summary, STAR voting satisfies the [[monotonicity criterion]], the [[resolvability criterion]], and [[reversal symmetry]]. It does not satisfy either the [[Condorcet criterion]] (i.e., is not a [[Condorcet method]]) or the [[Condorcet loser criterion]], although with all-strategic voters and perfect information the Condorcet winner is a [[Nash equilibrium]].<ref>Laslier, J.-F. (2006) [http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/12/17/51/PDF/stratapproval4.pdf "Strategic approval voting in a large electorate,"] ''IDEP Working Papers'' No. 405 (Marseille, France: Institut D'Economie Publique)</ref> It does not satisfy the [[later-no-harm criterion]], meaning that giving a positive rating to a less preferred candidate can cause a more preferred candidate to lose.
STAR passes the [[Majority criterion|majority criterion]], and thus is equivalent to [[Choose-one FPTP voting|choose-one FPTP voting]] whenever voters indicate all of their preferences, only in the one- or two-candidate cases (because a majority of voters will have scored their 1st choice higher than all other candidates, and with only at most two candidates in the race, their 1st choice must be one of the two highest-scored candidates, so they'll win the runoff), and passes the majority criterion for rated ballots in the
== Discussion ==
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