Single transferable vote: Difference between revisions

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Keep notes about bullet-points outside of the list to avoid cluttering that list.
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* Disallowing them, requiring full rankings
* Counting a ballot with N top-ranked candidates as 1/N of a vote for each candidate.
* Giving one vote to each equally-top-ranked candidate. Can optionally be combined with a suggestion that ballots that equally rank candidates shouldn't be able to prevent the elimination of those candidates.<ref name="reddit 2011">{{cite web | title=Proportionality failure in STV with equal-ranks with whole votes : EndFPTP | website=reddit | date=2019-12-05 | url=https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/e6bt6s/proportionality_failure_in_stv_with_equalranks/f9thuy4/?context=8&depth=9 | access-date=2020-02-10}}</ref>
* Giving one vote to each equally-top-ranked candidate. Note that this can lead to different results when using either the "if in any round any candidate gets a Droop quota (majority, in the single-winner case) they win" rule or the "all but ((number of winners) + 1) candidates must be eliminated, with the (number of winners) candidates with the most votes then winning" rule. Single-winner example: 45 A=C>B, 35 B>A>C, 20 C>B>A. If the first rule is used (modified to also say "if multiple candidates have Droop quotas in the same round, the candidates with the largest Droop quotas win."), then C wins, whereas under the second rule A wins. The second rule can actually create greater possibility for [[Tactical voting#Types of tactical voting|pushover]] strategy, since it could have been the case the A=C>B voters' honest preferences were A>B>C, and if they had voted their honest preference, B would've won, a worse result from their point of view. Also, this can lead to different results when using either the "all candidates who reach quota are elected" rule or the "the candidate who most exceeds the quota is elected, then spend their ballots, and repeat" rule. 3-winner example with Droop quotas: 34 A=B=C, 33 D 33 E. A, B, and C win under the former rule, while A, D, and F win under the latter rule.
 
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*Note Givingthat onegiving a vote to each equally-top- ranked candidate. Note that this can lead to different results when using either the "if in any round any candidate gets a Droop quota (majority, in the single-winner case) they win" rule or the "all but ((number of winners) + 1) candidates must be eliminated, with the (number of winners) candidates with the most votes then winning" rule. Single-winner example: 45 A=C>B, 35 B>A>C, 20 C>B>A. If the first rule is used (modified to also say "if multiple candidates have Droop quotas in the same round, the candidates with the largest Droop quotas win."), then C wins, whereas under the second rule A wins. The second rule can actually create greater possibility for [[Tactical voting#Types of tactical voting|pushover]] strategy, since it could have been the case the A=C>B voters' honest preferences were A>B>C, and if they had voted their honest preference, B would've won, a worse result from their point of view. Also, this can lead to different results when using either the "all candidates who reach quota are elected" rule or the "the candidate who most exceeds the quota is elected, then spend their ballots, and repeat" rule. 3-winner example with Droop quotas: 34 A=B=C, 33 D 33 E. A, B, and C win under the former rule, while A, D, and F win under the latter rule.
*Can optionally be combined with a suggestion that ballots that equally rank candidates shouldn't be able to prevent the elimination of those candidates.<ref name="reddit 2011">{{cite web | title=Proportionality failure in STV with equal-ranks with whole votes : EndFPTP | website=reddit | date=2019-12-05 | url=https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/e6bt6s/proportionality_failure_in_stv_with_equalranks/f9thuy4/?context=8&depth=9 | access-date=2020-02-10}}</ref>
 
=== Methods of transferring excess votes ===
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