Smith//IRV: Difference between revisions
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== Notes == |
== Notes == |
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When there are only 3 candidates in the Smith set, Smith//IRV elects the [[Pairwise counting#Terminology|pairwise winner]] between the two candidates with the most 1st choices after eliminating everyone outside of the Smith set and redistributing support. |
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Smith//IRV passes [[ISDA]] (Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives) but fails mono-add-plump (adding in ballots that bullet vote the winner shouldn't make the winner lose), which is the opposite of several other Condorcet-IRV hybrids. <ref name="Green 2001 four">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage |first=J. |title=Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods for single-winner elections | journal=Voting matters | issue=29 | pages=1–14 | year=2011 | url=http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf}}</ref> |
Smith//IRV passes [[ISDA]] (Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives) but fails mono-add-plump (adding in ballots that bullet vote the winner shouldn't make the winner lose), which is the opposite of several other Condorcet-IRV hybrids. <ref name="Green 2001 four">{{cite journal | last=Green-Armytage |first=J. |title=Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods for single-winner elections | journal=Voting matters | issue=29 | pages=1–14 | year=2011 | url=http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf}}</ref> |
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